Quest for South-south President: Myth or Reality?

By Dr Obi Iwuagwu

Introduction
There may not be a better way to describe the current political crisis in Nigeria, than the words of the country's late Head of State, General Sani Abacha, who while inaugurating the National Constitutional Conference on June 27, 1994, had observed that 'the fitful convulsions of political and emotional overreactions, which have intermittently agitated our young and budding democracy have been instigated by the lack of consensus culture of national consensus conceived in the broadest sense'. It was based on this that he counseled that 'the democratic nation we are building will be best sustained by coordinative rather than subordinate relationships with proper sympathy for equal claims to political power, legitimacy and social justice'. As a possible solution to the problem, his administration later created the six geo-political zones: North-east, North-west and North-central, South-east, South-west and South-south. But several years after this does not seem to have solved Nigeria's perennial political problems.

However, several scholars agree that perhaps the surest way of guaranteeing democracy is by making the system dynamic and sustainable. This would involve ensuring that it is inclusive and participatory; just, while promoting transparency and accountability; and at the same time embodies the aspirations of majority of the citizens. Again, it is possibly because some, if not all of these factors are lacking in the Nigerian system that the country is yet to stabilise several years after independence. These problems overtime have become endemic, and so have their solutions become challenging. However, this is not surprising for as Niccolo Machiavelli says, political disorders, can be quickly healed if they are seen well in advance. But, when for lack of proper diagnosis, they are allowed to grow in such a way that everyone can recognise them, remedies are too late. Nevertheless, this may not be the case with Nigeria, if only the citizens would agree to retrace their steps and seek the path of equity and justice.

Nigeria has had a chequered social and political history, beginning from the pre­colonial through the colonial till the present. It is also true to say that not all Nigerians have had the same experience in the Nigerian enterprise. Whereas some groups have benefited immensely from the project, others have suffered tremendously within the same entity. Ikemba Nnewi, Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu puts it succinctly: 'some have enjoyed almost exclusively the monopoly of executive power at the highest levels. These have at their command, the distribution of patronage both to individuals or to collectives; it is only natural that such a lucky group would wish for the status quo to continue. The other group would naturally wish for change and would strive for change. For this group only change can give hope - hope that the unsatisfactory situation could be ameliorated'.2 If recent developments in the polity are anything to go by, the South-south zone belong to the later group, who feel unsatisfied with the Nigerian project and therefore desire for change. But what do they want? What are there grievances? Are their wishes and aspirations justified by facts of history? It is these issues and more that this paper intends to address. But first, who are the people of the South south zone?

South-south Zone

The South-south zone essentially encompasses most of Nigeria's Niger Delta seen geographically as 'a triangle with its apex between Ndoni and Aboh, descending eastwards to the Qua Iboe River at Eket and westwards to the Benin River with its base along the Atlantic Coast between the Bights of Benin and Biafra'. A more recent definition is the one that came with the division of the country into six geographical zones, thereby restricting the area to six states, namely Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo and Rivers.

Geographically this zone is strategic not only, to Nigeria but the entire West African Region. In fact, it's location by the coast made contact with the outside world mainly through trade feasible as far back as the 18th and 19th centuries. European merchants and traders even before the establishment of formal colonial rule had begun to set up trading posts in the area. Writing about the period, Ike Okonta suggests that John Beecroft, Her Majesty's Consul in the Niger Delta introduced the concept of gunboat diplomacy, beginning in the 1850s, forcing dubious treaties upon local kings and princes and offering them protection in return for allowing British traders to do as they pleased in their domains. Dissenting kings were either dethroned or exiled. Thus, 'the harsh treatment meted out to William Dappa Pepple, king of the leading palm oil producing city-state of Bonny, Jaja of Opobo, Bonny's commercial rival and Nana Olomu, merchant prince of the Itsekiri kingdom of Warri, was the beginning of an enterprise whose target was the exploitation of the economic resources of the local people and the institutionalisation of violence and coercion as instruments of political control'.3 Just before the beginning of formal colonial rule, an amalgamation of the different European businesses in the area was achieved, thus forming a formidable monopoly, which played a key role in the subjugation of the local peoples, by imposing illegal tariffs on their produce and forcing them to trade among themselves with the company playing the role of the middleman.

Thus, even before formal colonial rule this area had become strategic in the political economy of Nigeria.

But the real importance of this zone manifested just before independence in 1960, when crude oil was struck in commercial quantities at Oloibiri. Henceforth, the Niger Delta became central to Nigeria's future. Its enormous oil reserves assumed a commanding height of the country's economy. The region is also naturally endowed with viable deposits of hydrocarbon and gas resources. Presently, petroleum and its derivatives principally exploited in the Niger Delta dominate Nigeria's economy making up to 95% of exports, over 80% of annual revenue and up to 70% of budgetary expenditure. As a result of this, Nigeria has become Africa's largest oil producer and the world's 6th most important exporter of crude oil.

The beginning of commercial exploitation of crude oil in the zone was however to introduce a new phase in the history of the Niger Delta - that of marginalisation and environmental degradation. In fact, amidst all the confusion that abound in contemporary Nigerian politics, the painful reality is that whereas the Niger Delta produces the bulk of income-generating export that fuels the national economy, only a little of proceeds earned, returns to these areas. This is the major aberration in the operational dynamics of Nigeria's political economy.4 Be that as it may, the main causes of the present crisis in the Niger Delta could be traced to greed and selfishness, deprivation and poverty as well as social injustice. Social justice here means that the same contribution equals the same benefit. And no community would be given more, when it contributes less or be given less when it contributes more. This is the crux of the matter in the Niger Delta crisis.5 We would however examine this in greater details in the next section.

Nigeria's Political Leadership 1960 - 2006
After years of colonial rule followed by a brief period of nationalist movements characterised by strikes, constitutional conferences and ethnic politics, Britain granted Nigeria political independence on October 1, 1960. The independence government was headed by Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), who hailed from the present North east zone. He was the Prime Minister, under a parliamentary form of government with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) as ceremonial President, while Chief Obafemi Awolowo, of the Action Group (AG) was the leader of opposition.

However, a direct manifestation of the colonial tradition in the post independence government was the reemergence of the politics of ethnic domination. As a political strategy, the colonial policy of divide and rule emphasised ethnic and regional sectionalism, to curb pan-Nigerian nationalism and to maintain colonial power. Structurally, the British colonial administration therefore emphasised the differences among Nigerians rather than similarities. It was however, surprising that the Nigerian political class, who inherited power in 1960, continued the manipulation of the ethnic differences for their selfish interests. In the process, they succeeded in creating the false impression that various politicians and political parties were champions of the interests of the ethnic formations for which they spoke and that the struggles of these parties for political dominance represented the struggles of their various ethnic groups for ascendance in society. Whereas, in the colonial period, both the Jos and Kano Riots of 1945 and 1953, as well as the Tiv uprisings of 1959/60 were manifestations of ethnic squabbles, the events, which led to the imposition of the state of emergency in Western Nigeria in 1962, ethnic massacres in the army in 1967 as well as the 30 month civil war (1967 - 1970) all had ethnic colorations. Of course, it was clear that sooner ,than later the post independence government was to be consumed in a crisis, which it had itself engineered. And this was exactly what happened.

First, it started with the crisis in the Western Region, where Chief S. L Akintola, deputy leader of the AG and Premier of the Region, himself an ally of the NPC/NCNC central government had disagceed with his party. Immediately, the central government exploited what was supposedly an internal disagreement within the AG to declare a state of emergency in the region and to further tear the party apart Next. Chief Obafemi Awolowo and a few others were arrested and charged for treason, while an inquiry was instituted into the AG government under him. A further strike at the soul of AG was the creation of the Mid-west State from the Western Region - an action aimed at depleting the power base of the party. Of course, this became obvious once similar demands for the creation of new states especially from the Niger Delta (COR - Calabar Ogoja Rivers State) and the Middle Belt state were ignored. The census result of 1964, whose result dramatically showed that the population of the North was more than that of the West and East put together further inflamed an already charged polity. This was not helped by growing poverty among the people even as government officials were often accused of corruption and financial recklessness. The casus belli was however the last minute effort by the NPC led government to manipulate the electoral process in the West Region in favour of Chief S. L. Akintola and his newly formed Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Subsequently, a group of young military officers on January 15, 1966, led by Major Kaduna Njeogwu, attempted to overthrow the federal government. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and two other regional premiers (North and West) all lost their lives in the coup.

However, the poor execution of the coup made it inconclusive and Nigeria's highest military officer, Maj. General Johnson Thomas Aguiyi Ironsi, from the South east subsequently took over power as Head of State. The unresolved differences between the East and the West especiallv pertaining to this coupled with some of the initial policies of the Ironsi administration resulted in the early termination of the life of this government. Ironsi was eventually killed six months after, while on tour of the Western Region, and Major Yakubu Gowon, this time from the North Central on August 1, 1966 became Nigeria's new Head of State. His assumption of office further generated more controversies in the military and especially in the relationship between him and Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, then military governor of Eastern Nigeria, who had argued that like in case of Gen. Ironsi, rather than Maj. Gowon, Brigadier Ogundipe, who was then the highest serving Nigerian military Officer should have become Head of State. It was the failure to amicably resolve this particular crisis that led to the collapse of the Regional arrangement and the adoption of a twelve states structure on May 27, 1967. On that same day, Col. Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra, which essentially comprised the former Eastern Region (including the present South-south geopolitical zone). A civil war broke out between the Nigerian side and the new Republic of Biafra. The rest is now history. But what is clear is that several lives were lost on both sides, with millions of properties destroyed, even as all forms of social and political development were truncated.

General Gowon was Nigeria's Head of State all through the 30 month civil war and even after, until his administration was toppled on July 29th 1975. Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, this time from the North west became the new Head of State. Muhammed was in charge for only a brief period (seven months) as he was again assassinated on February 13, 1976, but before then his administration had taken some far reaching decisions bothering on the restructuring of the country's social life and rehabilitation of Nigeria's ailing infrastructure. Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, then his deputy, from the South west succeeded him as Head of State. It is on record that following the clamour for a return of power to the civilians, which in the first place was one of the reasons for the overthrow of General Gowon's administration, General Obasanjo successfully handed over power to Aihaji Shehu Shagari from the North east on October 1, 1979, following the success of his party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), in the elections of that year.

A lot of people say that the succeeding civilian administration in the second republic grossly failed to perform to the expectations of Nigerians. Again, ethnic politics, which characterised the first republic returned in new dimensions, but of more serious significance, was the fact that politicians in the country became divided along ideological lines. Thus, the conservatives represented mostly by the ruling NPN and remaining loyalists of the defunct Northern Peoples Congress came to confront the progressive forces championed by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) and the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), all of which could be said to have metamorphosed from the old AG, NCNC and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) respectively. Nevertheless, it was the corruption associated with this administration and more importantly, the massive rigging that characterized the 1983 general elections, which eventually led to the military coup of December 31, 1983. Maj. General Muhammadu Buhari from the North central thus became Nigeria's new leader. This regime is remembered for its unrepentant War Against Indiscipline (WAI) and repressive decrees aimed at punishing corruption and general indiscipline.

Muhammadu Buhari's administration was toppled in yet another military coup led by his colleague in arms and brother from the same North central zone, Major General Ibrahim Babangida. Like Gen. Gowon's administration, the regime of General Babangida lasted for nine years until 1993. The highpoint of this administration was its annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election allegedly won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Many still consider the June 12, 1993 election as the freest and fairest election in the history of Nigeria. The bitterness and rancour that came with Babangida's decision was later to cost him his seat, as he was practically forced to 'step aside' on August 27, 1993. The administration was later replaced by an interim government led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, again from the South west. Shonekan's administration, which lasted only three months, remains the shortest so far in the annals of Nigerian history.

In what has been described as a palace coup, Shonekan. was shortly removed as Head of State. He was replaced by General Sani Abacha from the North west, who assumed power on November 17, 1993 and ruled till 1998. The repressive policies of this administration was what ultimately convinced majority of Nigerians that even the worst civilian administration was still better than the best military regime. Not only did this regime emasculate all opposition, not a few Nigerians are known to have lost their lives in mysterious circumstances. Hence, many attributed the hand of God in the death of General Abacha on June 8, 1998. Abacha was replaced by General Abdusalami Abubakar who hails from the North central zone. The later perhaps in conformity with the mood of the nation immediately announced a nine month transition programme, which culminated in the hand over of power to civilians on May 29, 1999. This was how incumbent President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo from the South west became Nigeria's 12th ruler and third elected leader coming after Aihaji Tafawa Balewa and Alhaji Shehu Shagari respectively. All the others were serving soldiers, except Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian who was handpicked to lead the defunct interim government.

Nevertheless, the role of the military in Nigeria's politics and governance deserves a little more attention. The military in Nigeria, which is highly politicised, often justifies its frequent interventions in government via coup d'etat as a corrective measure for corruption and misrule by civilians, although military rule often turns out to be more corrupt. It often claims to be a force for the restoration of democracy, but its incessant interventions and long stays in government undermine democracy through lack of accountability, disdain for human rights and political freedoms, and erosion of democratic institutions. In fact, the dominance, predominance and prolongation of military rule in Nigeria combined with corruption to undermine due process, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and efficiency in government.

South-south's Quest for Nigeria's Presidency
Some scholars have argued that the constant clamour for the restructuring of the Nigerian polity is a direct reaction to the malaise and limitations imposed on the nations development and the citizens well-being by the over centralisation of the polity and the obvious imbalance that has characterised Nigeria's leadership. For instance, the people of the Niger Delta (South-south) have insisted that they have no substantial benefit to show for their sacrifices, despite being the 'goose that laid the golden egg'.

Hence, the people frequently interpret the refusal of the British colonial administration with the active connivance of the three dominant political parties to grant them some level of political and economic autonomy in 1957; General Gowon's decree transferring the revenue from oil mined in their land to the federal government during the civil war in 1969; General Obasánjo's Land Use Act of 1978, which converted all land in the country, including oil minerals obtained from them to federal government property; down to General Babangida's enactment of the Treason and Treasonable Offences decree of 1993 and its application on Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni eight in November 1995; as actions aimed at denying the people their legitimate rights of self determination, and by extension use of their natural resources8. This in the long run inhibits their participation in the governance of the Nigerian state. Moreover, it is said that nobody can represent you better than yourself. Hence, people of the South south zone seem to have come to the conclusion that after decades of exploitation and marginalisation, coupled with the insensitivity of past administrations, nobody can represent their interests better than one of their own.

Of course, to lead a multi-ethnic society while remaining committed to democratic principles and norms is an uphill task. This is because incorporating, several ethnic groups into a single political system means bringing together the basic problem of ethnic conflict as well. Group loyalties dividing a multi-ethnic society can, and do undermine, a common identity, national culture, or consensus on democratic values. Given the presence of politically assertive ethnic groups, the stability and survival of the present democratic politics may ultimately depend on how we control the potential ethnic disputes that occasionally arise.9

The previous section had shown that within a little over its 45 years as a sovereign nation, people from the present six geographical zones of the country had occupied Nigeria's seat of power in the following order: North east - 6 years; North west - 6 years; North central - 23 years; South east - 6 months; South west 11 years; and South south - Nil. What this means is that there is an obvious imbalance against the South south, which has not been in government at all and the South east that has ruled for only six months. The demand by the two zones for the presidency is all the more justified considering that Nigeria's current democratic experiment has been anchored on a zonal arrangement at all levels - from the federal, states and local governments. Of course we are aware that key appointments in Nigeria presently take cognisance of this zonal arrangement.

The point has already been made that Nigeria's economy practically depends on the resources of the former Eastern Region, which today includes the South east and South south zones. It is also not in doubt that these areas have suffered the highest level of marginalization in terms of provision of infrastructural facilities. Therefore to completely deprive the zones and in particular the South south that has never tested the office before of political power in the coming dispensation, would amount to grave injustice.

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the so much political tension of the recent past is now beginning to undermine the economic foundations of the Nigerian state. For instance despite the change from military to civilian government in 1999, there is still widespread deployment of army, navy and paramilitary mobile police to guard oil facilities in the Niger Delta. Added to this is the spate of killings and kidnappings, which has made Nigeria's oil business generally insecure. But this should not surprise anybody. In fact, from the earliest times the colonial government created an unequal relationship between the people of the Niger Delta and outsiders. In the process, the inhabitants became increasingly, conscious of their loss of fundamental human rights 'as colonialism instituted a master-servant relationship between external dominant forces and the local population. This was more or less carried over to the post independence period, creating a feeling of internal colonialism within the area and Nigeria's majority ethnic groups. This situation dates back to the 1950s but became pronounced from the late 1960s when petroleum assumed a dominant profile in the Nigerian political economy.

Several government interventionist policies including the OMPADEC, NDDC, 13% derivation formula as well as numerous government committees, introduced to provide succour' to the people, have all failed to assuage the feelings of the Niger Delta who now seem determined to take their turn at the country's top job. Hence many now argue that at the heart of the Niger Delta struggle is the peoples demand for equity and justice, especially as it relates to equal participation in the governance of their country. Given that they are the only zone that has not ruled Nigeria since independence.

Conclusion
It was the late sage Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who said that compromise is the art of symbolic living. Therefore, the most successful politicians are usually those who compromise for the common good, whilst not sacrificing fundamental principles. Of course, Nigeria's current situation requires dialogue and compromise by all and sundry. However, this must also be guided by reason and informed opinion. The challenge is for the emergent political class, to ensure that equity and justice informs whatever decisions they take. This is also taking into consideration that there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a states constitution. The innovator usually makes enemies of all those who prosper under the old order as only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new." Everything points to the fact that for the sustenance of Nigeria's democracy, it is imperative that we must restore the trust and confidence of the different groups. To truncate the zonal arrangement midway would be counter productive.

The case of the South south and South east are self evident. Everything points to the fact that the two zones are presently marginalised. This is even more painful considering their significant contributions to the common purse. Therefore, their quest for the presidency of Nigeria is not only supported by facts but must also be considered as a necessary investment in the Nigerian project.

We must guarantee equality of the zones, while granting them fair access to resources and political power in the country.

Dr. Iwuagwu of the Department of History & Strategic Studies,University of Lagos, Akoka, Yaba, delivered this paper at an agenda-setting Political Leadership Dialogue organised by the Centre for Political Leadership and Communications Research, Lagos.