Atiku Abubakar

By Justice Umaru Abdullahi, President, Court of Appeal
I am about to embark on the in terpretation of the provisions of the Constitution in an area which I respectfully hold to be Novel in the sense that never in the annals of this country had a court been invited to examine and determine that the second highest office in the realm is vacant. It behoves me to take the‘ assignment with the highest sense of responsibility and caution in the interest of the country and posterity. I will therefore, be guided by the principle of interpretation of the Constitution enunciated in the case Nafiu Rabiu v. State (1981) 2 NCLR 293. It seems to me to be locus classicus on construing our Constitution. It discountenanced frivolity and requires court, in construing the Constitution to do so with liberalism and should avoid constructing it in a manner that one section would defeat the intent or purpose of another. At page 326 thereof, His Lordship, Sir Udo Udoma, JSC of the blessed memory said:-
“… it is the duty of this court to bear constantly in mind the fact that the present constitution has been proclaimed the Supreme Law of the Land; that it is a written, organic instrument meant to serve not only the present generation, but also several generations yet unborn; that it was made, enacted and given to themselves by the People of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. . . . . . . . that the function of the Constitution is to establish a framework and principles of government, broad and general in terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of our several communities must involve, ours being a plural, dynamic society, and therefore, mere technical rules of interpretation of statutes are to some extent inadmissible in a way so as to defeat the principles of government enshrined in the constitution. And where the question is whether the constitution has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, in my view, this court should whenever possible, and in response to the demands of justice, lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purposes of the constitution.
My lords, it is my view that the approach of this court to the construction of the constitution should be, and so it has been, one of liberalism, probably a variation on the theme of the general maxim utres magis valent quam pereat. I do not conceive it to be the duty of this court so to construe any of the provisions of the constitution so as to defeat the obvious ends the constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.”
Having set out the parameter on which to proceed, I propose to consider the various sections of the Constitution.
It is the plaintiff contention that section 142(1) deals entirely with the issue of nomination which has no relevance to the disqualification of a Vice President. It is submitted, on the other hand, on behalf of first, second and sixth defendants that the plaintiff having resigned from the political party that sponsored his election to the office of the Vice President and having joined another political party, Action Congress forfeited his office of Vice President. He has thereby abandoned the manifesto of the party which puts him in office and embraced that of a rival political party which are in any case different -and also his lambasting of the party that catapulted him into office, he has breach the provisions of section 142(1) of the Constitution which envisaged that both the President and Vice President must belong to one political party. I wish to observe that no manifesto was produced by either parties particularly first defendant. The issue of differences of manifesto cannot be considered and determined.
It is settled that in construing the provisions of a statute where the words are clear and unambiguous it is the words used that prevail and not what the judge says the provisions mean unless where giving it literal interpretation will lead to absurdity. In Mobil Oil (Nigeria) Limited vs. Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1977) 3 SC. 53, 74, the Supreme Court stated as follows:-
”The general rule for construing a statute is where the words of statute are clear the court shall give effect to their literal meaning. It is only when the literal meaning may result in ambiguity or injustice that the court may seek internal aid within the body of the statute itself or external and from statute in pari material in order to resolve the ambiguity or avoid doing injustice.”
See also Nablah v. Nabla (1967) All NLR 47 and Goodrich v. Palsner (1957) A.C. 65, 85 pel‘ Lord Reld:-
”No court is entitled to substitute its words - for the words of the Act.”
The words of section 142(1) of the constitution which is already set out in this judgment deals with qualification for election as was rightly submitted on behalf of the plaintiff. At that stage, respectfully the presidential candidate who nominates his associate or colleague or companion was entitled to drop his running mate at any stage before the election subject of course, to the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act for any reason. After the election and they were jointly declared elected upon one becoming President and the other Vice President the former loses his discretion to remove the latter at will. His removal is now subject to other provisions of the constitution, such as section 143 or 144.
The bond of companionship which compelled them, particularly the Vice Presidential candidate, to remain together during election loosen and they would swim to certain extent, separately. The interest tangible or intangible of the Vice President vests and could no longer be so easily wished away by either the President or the political party which sponsored them for the election. On his election, he ceased to be Vice Presidential candidate of the sponsoring party and becomes the Vice president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by the grace of the electorate and no longer of the President who nominated him as his running mate and the party which sponsored both, of them. These Vice Presidential candidates are not always liability, atimes they are assets who bring strength to the ticket. Will this bond of friendship prevent him from assuming office in the event of impeachment of the President? Certainly not.

I am not unaware of the diction of erudite justice. of the Supreme Court, Sir Udo Udoma, which I have already reproduced elsewhere in this judgment, which I intend to repeat here for emphasis. He said:
“Court should whenever possible and in response to the demands of justice, lean to the broader interpretation, unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purposes of the Constitution.”
Considering the emotional or political undertone of the case, one might be tempted to prefer a broader interpretation of Section 142(1) of the Constitution and swallow line, hook and sinker the view that the Vice President vacates his office on his resigning from the political party, which sponsored him for the office and opted for the new party; Action Congress. But there are two main constraints, the intention of the makers of the Constitution and the freedom of the Vice President call for examination.
The Vice President under the Constitution enjoys freedom of association. If he looses his office as Vice President it will have the consequence of penalising him for exercising his constitutional right to peaceful assembly and association. Plaintiff’s right to freedom of association is entrenched in Section 40 of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constiturion, which provides as follows:-
“40, Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interest.
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not derogate from the powers conferred by this constitution on the Independent National Electoral Commission with respect to political parties to which that Commission does not accord recognition.”
(undelinings mine)
Clearly the plaintiff's right to peaceful assembly and association is untrammelled. The only infraction or derogation of this freedom is when it concerns a political party, which is not recognized by the Independent National Electoral Commission. It is not the case of any of the defendants that the Action Congress is a political party, which is not recognized by the Independent National Electoral Commission. His right to associate is consequently guaranteed by the Constitution and he should not suffer any detriment for exercising this right.
The other constraint attending to my reluctance to opt for broader interpretation of Section 142(1) is that it is undoubtedly not the intention of the makers of the Constitution that if the President or Vice President resigns from the political party which puts him in office and embraces rival political party his office is declared vacant. Firstly, if that was the intention of the makers of the Constitution it’would have so stated expressly. I agree with the submission of Chief Olanipekun, learned Senior Counsel for Plaintiff that when the makers of the Constitution so wished it for members of the National and State Houses of Assembly they unequivocally so provided under Sections 68(1)(g) and 109 (1) (g) respectively of the Constitution. Sections 68(l)(g) and 109(I’)(g) are similarly worded. Section 38(I)(g) is hereby set down immediately hereunder:-
“68 (1) A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House of which he is a member if
(If) being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of a another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected.”
The proviso thereto is not relevant to the point presently under consideration. The defendants failed or neglected or refused to proffer a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for the omission of corresponding provision to Sections 68(l)(g) and 109(1) (g) for the President and the Vice President in event of their leaving the party on whose platform they were elected for another party in Section 142.
The only attempt made by learned senior counsel for sixth defendant, Mr. Gadzama, was not only feeble but also mundane. It is therefore not the intention of the Constitution to forfeit Vice President seat on abandoning his former party.
Learned senior counsel for the first, second and third defendants made mountain out of a mole hill on the word “associate” which appears in
• sub-section (1) of Section 142 of the Constitution. The word is defined by Black Dictionary of Law as colleague or companion. It was further contended that it was designed to correct a mischief which existed in the previous constitution. It was sought to rely on the Hansard of the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the 1979 Constitution. The authority for relying on an extraneous matter in interpreting the Constitution according to them, is the dictum of Ayoola, JSC in the case of Peoples Democratic Party & Another Vs Independent National Electoral Commission & other (199) 11 NWLR (pt626) 2000.
The said Hansard was not practice and is therefore not before the court. Similarly it was a matter discussed by the makers of the 1979 Constitution and not by the makers of the present Constitution. The circumstances whereby it became relevant to the present Constitution is not presented to the court. The court cannot therefore act on a piece of evidence, which was probably available but was not tendered. This court like any other court is not given to speculation. It is also observed that the led judgment in the case referred to us was written by Uwais, CJN consequently the judgment of Ayoola, JSC relied upon respectfully is obiter dictum. It is settled that this court is bound by the ratio decedendi of the Supreme Court and not its abiter dictum.
However, the issue of relevance of extraneous matter in the interpretation of the Constitution, it seems to me, had been settled by the Supreme Court as far back as April 6, 1961. In the matter of reference under Section 108 of the Constitution of the Federation: In re J. S. Olawoyin Vs Commissioner of Police (1961) All NLR 213, 223 — 224 where Brett, FJ said:
The court ruled against submission (v) during the hearing and refused to consider the Report of the conference. The Attorney General cited the judgment of Lord Halsbury in Eastman Photographic Materials and Co. Vs Comptroller of Patients (1898) A. C 571, 575 and other authorities on the question what sources of construction the courts are entitled to appeal to in order to construct a statute, but the rules enunciated in those cases only came into operation if the words used in the statute are ambiguous. This principle was re-stated recently in the judgment of the Privy Cownoil in Kathkiro of Buganda Vs Attorney General (1961) 1 WLR 119, 128, where their Lordships upheld the refusal of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa to admit a white paper in evidence for the purpose of constructing one of the Constitutional instruments in force in the Protectorate of Uganda, on the ground that they “found no ambiguity which would justify the admission of extraneous evidence.” It appeared to me that Chief Rotimi Williams put the matter correctly when he said that the omission from the construction of Northern Nigeria of any provision corresponding to Section 142 (13) of the 1954 Constitution order was something which might cause surprises, but not something which led to ambiguity.
Similarly, the insertion of the word “associate" is a matter of details which leads to no ambiguity.
Learned senior counsel for first, second and sixth defendants contended that the plaintiff had resigned his office as Vice President. It was however, conceded by them that the resignation they had in mind was constructive, there being no letter of resignation before the court. It was contended that the resignation could only be inferred from the attitude or conduct of the Vice President of recent.
Learned senior counsel cited a long array of authorities, which derived mainly from duties dedaratory of common law principles of contract, equality, commerce and trust.
Learned counsel for the Senate, Mr. Eze and Mr. Ezechukwu for the National Assembly refused to be associated with the concept of contract of service introduced into the interpretation of a statutory provision. It is the view of the learned counsel for National Assembly that the Constitution, which is a written one, has shared or divided powers between the three arms of government, Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. That removal of a President or Vice President is the prerogative of their respective clients and does not belong to the Executive nor the Judiciary. It was also contended by Mr. Eze that the Vice President is a holder of the second highest office and his office is not a subject of master and servant relationship. There is merit in this submission. The principle of master and servant or contract of service is most inappropriate. The Vice President and the President were jointly elected at a general election. None of them qualifies as an employee. All the decided cases cited in support of the contention that Vice President resigned constructively are not only irrelevant but also unacceptable. A document such as Nigerian Constitution, which is written cannot be interpreted on decision based on common law principles or decisions which are interpretation of statutes which themselves have not been demonstrated to be In pan materia with the provisions of the Constitution under consideration. See Olaleke Obadare v. The President, Ibadan West District Grade B Customary Court (1964) 1 All NLR 336, 342; (1965) NMLR 39 where it was stated by the Supreme Court thus:-
“We do not consider that the correct way of interpreting Section 11.7 of the Constitution of the Federation is to look to decisions on the meaning of an English statute with different wordings. Having regard to the origin of the Nigerian Legal System and statute book, decisions on English Statute will naturally carry very great weight where the wording is identical, but, to adopt what was said by Lord’Herschell on the House of Lords in Bank of England v. Vagilans (1891)A.C. 107 in relation to a statute which is declaratory of the common law, the proper course in construing the constitution is in the first instance to examine the meaning of the statutes and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the law of England, and not to start with inquiring how the law of England stands and then assuming that it was probably intended to adopt it unaltered.”
(underlining mine)
See Nigerian Ports Authority v. All Akar & Sons (1965)
1 All NLR 259,263 where it was stated thus:“In the construction of a statute it is necessary that the words used by the statute should be considered and that the construction should not be based on any assumption that the statute is merely a declaratory of a particular state of things or any existing law.
(underlining mine).
It is respectfully my view that in interpreting the Constitution it will not be satisfactory or proper to start by looking for meaning or other interpretation of some legislations, including constitution which are not In parl materia with the wordings of our constitution. But foreign legislations and constitution with similar or identical provisions will carry some measure of weight in their persuasive effect. It is always important not to forget that the circumstances may not be the same:
Olaleke Obadero & others v. President, Ibadan West District Council Grade ‘B’ Customery Court (Supra). The Vice President not being an employee cannot be impliedly or constructively removed. Assuming he qualifies as an employee, without, for a moment so deciding, his employer would most manifestly be the people of Nigeria, who elected him to the office, acting through their representatives in the National Assembly but certainly not the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor the sponsoring political party. This assumption is based on the cliché the power to hire is the power to fire embedded in Section II of the Interpretation Act. See Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2005) All FWLR (Pt260) 65. In other words, this matter is a matter that falls squarely within the contemplation of Section 143 of the Constitution, which expressly provides for the removal of the President and Vice President from office.
On resignation, the Constitution itself left no one in doubt. It provided specifically for resignation of person appointed, elected or otherwise selected to any office established under the Constitution; the mode of their resignation and the authority or person to whom the notice is to be addressed. The resignation becomes effective when the notice is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or by the person authorised by that authority or person to receive on his behalf. In the case of the Vice President the notice of resignation shall be addressed to the President. In the instant case, the provisions of Section 306(1)(2) and(3) are pertinent. It is recited hereunder for ease of reference:
“306(1) Save as otherwise provided in this section any person who is appointed, elected or otherwise selected to any office established by the constitution may resign from that office by writing under his hand addressed to the authority or person by whom he was appointed, elected or selected.
(2) The resignation of any person from any office established by this Constitution shall take effect when the writing signifying the resignation is received by the authority or person to whom it is addressed or by any person authorised by that authority or person to receive it.
(3) The notice of resignation of the President and of the Vice President shall respectively be addressed to the President of the Senate and to the President.”
This section just repeated above seems to respectfully exclude resignation by implication or conduct especially subsection (2) thereof which predicates effective date of resignation on the receipt of the notice of resignation by the appropriate authority or persons. There is no one charged with the duty of monitoring the conduct of a person appointed, elected or selected into an office established under the Constitution, to make the necessary inference and thereby fix the date of resignation. The approach will be fraught with a lot of dangers, including selective application and subjectivity.
In any case, the Supreme Court in the case of Commerce Bank Nig. Ltd. A.G. Anambra State (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt 261) 528, 556 stated the law on method of performing a duty imposed by statutory provision to the effect that it is the method that must be complied with as follows:
“Now it is the law that where a statute provides for a particular method of performing a duty regulated. by the statute, that method, and no other must have to be adapted.”
And in Nuru Sani Ibrahim vs INEC (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt 614) 334, 352 this Court per Salami, J.C.A. reiterated the law as follows:
“It is settled law that where a legislation lays down a procedure for doing a thing, there should be lay down method of doing it.”
The wording of Section 306 of the Constitution are clear, plain and unambiguous, therefore there should be no other procedure for removal of the plaintiff, the Vice President other than what is prescribed by the Constitution.
Next to be considered is the question of the Vice President breaching “his obligation of the mindedness, loyalty, material trust, confidence and good faith.”
The passage or its variant run through most of the questions framed for determination of the first defendant’s counter originating summons. This point was strenuously pressed or pursued by the first defendant supported by the second and sixth defendants, the Inspector-General of Police and the Independent National Electoral Commission. None of them directed the attention of the court to any authority, statutory or decided case. I, too, do not know of any authority which creates a supine, single minded Vice President, indeed a robot. It is respectfully, to my mind not the intention of the Constitution to create a Vice President with no mind of his own. I shudder to imagine what would be the fate of the country in likely event of a President being in office or impeached and the Vice President has to assume Office of the President. The only source from which one can glean the person to whom the Vice President, indeed all those who hold their offices under the Constitution owe allegiance and loyalty is the Oaths of Allegiance and the various oaths of office contained in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It behoves me to read them fully.
Oaths of Allegiance reads as follows:
“I, do solemnly swear/affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that I will preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."
And the oath of office of the Vice President, Deputy Governor, Minister, Commissioner or Special Adviser to which the Vice-President subscribed provides as follows:
“I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that as Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria/Deputy Governor of State/Minister of the Government of Federation/Commissioner of the Government of State/Special Adviser, I will discharge my duties to the best of my ability faithfully in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the law, and always in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, solidarity, well being and prosperity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will strive to preserve the Fundamental objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy contained in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will not allow my personal interest to influence my official conduct or my official decision; that I will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will abide by the code of conduct contained in the 7th Schedule to the constitution of the Federal
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA; THAT IN ALL circumstanCes, I WILL DO RIGHT TO ALL MANNER OF PEOPLE, according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will; that I will not direct or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any matter which shall be brought under my consideration or shall become known to me as Vice President...
So help me God.”
I have painstakingly reproduced both the Oath of allegiance and Oath of Office of the Vice-President etc and can find nowhere in both Oaths where loyalty and faithfulness and true allegiance is owned to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria who in his own right subscribes to the same Oath of Allegiance with the Vice-President and an Oath of Office that is essentially identical to that sworn to by the Vice-President. I agree that the Vice President should have an undivided loyalty but that loyalty is due to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and not, I repeat not, to Mr. President nor Peoples Democratic Party who in any case is a stranger to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. If the Vice-President were to have undivided loyalty to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as postulated by the defendants how does he defend the constitution, which he has sworn to defend in event the President’s interest or desire is in conflict with the constitution. It is, respectfully my view, that the Vice President’s allegiance is to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and has an unreserved or unalloyed duty to defend the constitution as adumbrated in his Oath of office and the Oath of Allegiance.
The only outstanding point canvassed by the first, second and sixth defendants was their last line of defence. It is hinged on Section 146(3)( c). It is their last ditch that the phrase “( c) for any other reason” other than those prescribed or envisaged in the Constitution the office of the Vice-President could become vacant. The learned senior counsel failed to point to circumstances where paragraph (c ) of sub-section (3) of Section 146 could be invoked. Mr. Gadzama endeavoured in this regard when he said Section 136(3) (c) is. “For a situation which is not envisaged by the makers of the Constitution. It is so vague so nebulous that it cannot be fixed. But the Court assisted by counsel can fill the gap for instance in the case of abduction.”
Learned senior counsel went from sublime to ridiculous. He supplied no further aid than set out above.
Learned senior counsel for plaintiff on his own part contended that the court cannot go on a voyage of discovering in its efforts to fill in the gap. This is a perfect situation to fall back on the principle of ejusdem generis to determine the intention of the legislature: where general words come within the genus of the special word which they follow in a statue. Alas Section 146(3) provides no special words from which the general words can be identified. The whole subsection presents some difficulty. It appears there is some error on the part of the draftsman. I shall elucidate on this in course of consideration of the issue.
The apparent lacuna easily disappears when paragraph (c ) of subsection (3) is juxtaposed with subsection (1) of the same Section 146. Sub-section (1) of Section 146 provides as follows:
“146(1) The Vice President shall hold the Office of the President if the Office of the President becomes vacant by reason of death or resignation, impeachment, permanent incapacity or the removal of the President from office for any other reason in accordance with Section 143 or 144 of this Constitution.”
(underling mine).
Sub section (3) provides as follows:
“(3) where the Office of the Vice President becomes vacant (a) by reason of death or resignation, impeachment, permanent incapacity or removal in accordance with Sections 143 or 144 of this constitution:
(b) by his assumption of the Office of the President in accordance to sub-section (1) of this section; or
(c) for any other reason (in accordance with Sections 143 and 144 of this Constitution).
(bracket and contents mine),
I am respectfully of the opinion that paragraph ( c) of Section 146 (3) is duplicitous or repetitious. Its purpose or intendment is already conveyed in paragraph (a) thereof. I therefore agree with Chief Olanipekun, learned senior counsel for plaintiff that any other reason is referable to the Consitution and not to matters extraneous or outside of the Consitution. Otherwise the Court will be saddled with ridiculous or ardous task of drawing up a list of materials which might touch upon political or moral issues upon which courts have no jurisdiction.
In case I wrongly found that lacuna does not exist, it is necessary to examine if there is any remedial measure. For the court to enact or write into the Constitution what its makers failed to insert would amount to the court enacting laws and Lord Simmons described such an act as “a naked usurpation of legislature functions under the thin disguise of interpretation, and it is less justifiable when it is guess work with what materials the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act.”
See Magor & St Mellons Rural District Council V. Newsport Corporation (195 1)2 All & R 839 at
841.
It is not the function of the court to make laws but to interpret the words used by the legislature whose primary function is to make laws while that of the court is to declare it.
Assuming the court has the power of making a legislation, without so deciding, it is doubtful if the law given as a result of the interpretation of Section 146(3) ( c) would affect the plaintiff’s right or interest which had vested. The enactment purportedly made in the course of this judgment would clearly not be applicable to the circumstances Of this case. See Samuel Ekeocha v. The Civil Service Commission of Imo State & Another (198 1)1 NCLR 154, 165 where Oputa, (CJ) (as he then was) cited the case in Re Cuno (1889) 43 Ch. D 12, 19 where Blowen, L.J. remarked as follows:
“In the construction of statutes you must not construe the words so as to take away right which already existed before the statute was passed unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature.
Another factor militating against the contention of the counter claimant is that where there are two enactments, one making specific provisions and the other general provisions the specific provisions are impliedly excluded from the general provisions. See Government of Kaduna State Vs Kagome (1982)6 S.C 87, 107-108 per Fatayi Williams.CJN
“It is now trite that where there are two enactments, one making specific provisions, the specific provisions are by implication excluded from the general provisions.”
Similarly in Osadebey V. A. G. Bendel State (1991)1 SCN 102 218 Nnemaka-Agu JSC, stated inter alia thus:
“One of the basic principles of interpretation of all constitution and statutes is of course that the law maker will not be presumed to have given a right in one section and taken it in another.”.
The sum total of these authorities is that the general provision contained in Section 146(3) (c) will by implication excluded from the previous specific provisions enacted in Section 146 (3) (a) and (b) because it cannot be presumed that the intention of the makers of the Constitution is to give a right with one hand and taken same away by the other.
The contention Mr. lkwoeto learned senior counsel for second defendant is non-sequitur. The concept of collective responsibility is a feature of Parliamentary and not that of Executive system created by 1979 constitution and retained by our present constitution.
In view of the conclusion, I have arrinved in respect of all the issues canvassed, the answer to the plaintiffs first question is yes, the second question is answered No and the answer to the third question is No.
In respect of the first defendant’s first question; the answer is Yes. The court will not answer the first defendant’s second question because it is academic. The court is to answer live issues and not moot ones. The consequence of the vice President's resignation is provided for by the Constitution. The answer to the first defendant’s third question is No, The answer to fourth question is also No and the fifth question is equally answered No.
All the question formulated by the plaintiff having been resolved in his favour his claim succeeds and the reliefs sought by him are granted as follows:It is hereby declared that the term of office of the plaintiff as the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which commenced on May 29, 2003 still subsists and does not teninate until May 29, 2007.
Secondly, it is further declared that the President has no power under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other law to declare the office or seat of the plaintiff as Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vacant.
Thirdly, it is declared that the purported declaration by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of the office of the plaintiff as the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vacant is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
The remaining reliefs sought by the plaintiff will not be acceded to in view of the step or steps being taken by the first defendant to restore the plaintiff’s right and privileges accorded to his office. The orders of injunction restraining the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants when the rights and liberty of the plaintiff are no longer threatened and assailed by any of the defendants including the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria cannot be granted. Injunction is granted to protect the right or threatened right of the plaintiff. It will be refused since there is no evidence that the plaintiff’s right is under any threat from the defendants in the light of the three declarations made in his favour in this judgment.
The counter-claim of the first defendant is not made out. Having resolved all the questions framed in the counter-claim against the first defendant, it fails and is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
Although costs follow the event, this is not an appropriate case to make an order as to costs.
Each party to bear his or its own costs.
I agree: Isa Ayo Salami. Justice, Court of Appeal.
I agree Olufunlola Oyelola Adekeye, Justice, Court of Appeal.
I agree: .Abdu Aboki, Justice, Court of Appeal.
I agree: Chidiebere Nwaoma Uwa, Justice, Court of Appeal.

Excerpts from the landmark judgement of the Appeal Court, on the illegality of the President, declaring the seat of the Vice President vacant.